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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SEAN SALDATORE HURST,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48312-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-19-51706

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Sean Saldatore Hurst failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it executed a unified, aggregate sentence of ten years with four years fixed
following felony convictions for aggravated assault and stalking, as well as misdemeanor
convictions for using a telephone to annoy, harass, or offend, and two counts of violation of a nocontact order?
ARGUMENT
Hurst Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Hurst appeared in the lobby of his wife’s work, St. Luke’s hospital, and refused to leave
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when he was instructed to do so. (PSI, pp. 162-67. 1) He also repeatedly threatened his wife’s
friend and told her, amongst other things, “I’m going to kill you.” (PSI, pp. 277-78.) Ms. Hurst
sought and was granted a protection order, which officers were arranging to serve on Hurst when
they called his wife and Hurst overheard the call. (PSI, pp. 102-06.) Hurst “pulled two knives on
her and told her this would be a hostage situation.” (Id.) He made a call to the Boise police and
stated that if officers attempted to arrest him, he would “use deadly force if necessary.” (Id.)
Police attempted to negotiate his surrender for seven hours, during which the apartment complex
was partially evacuated and Hurst was “broadcasting this incident on Facebook Live or YouTube,”
before police eventually resorted to the use of tear gas and a K9 to apprehend him. (Id.)
Hurst was charged with aggravated assault, use of a firearm or deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony, resisting and/or obstructing an officer, and stalking in the first degree.
(R., pp. 54-56.) The state filed an amended information charging, in addition, a misdemeanor
count of using a telephone to annoy, harass, or offend, and two misdemeanor counts of violating a
no-contact order. (R., pp. 77-79.) The no-contact order violations were associated with attempts
by Hurst to contact his wife from jail. (PSI, p. 338; 7/7/20 Tr., p. 20, L. 1 – p. 21, L. 22. 2) Hurst
agreed to plead guilty to aggravated assault, stalking, telephonic harassment, and both counts of
violating a no-contact order. (R., pp. 80-91; 7/7/20 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L. 14.) In exchange, the
state agreed to dismiss the deadly weapon enhancement and the resisting and obstructing charge,
agreed not to file an Information Part Two alleging additional no-contact order violations, and
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References to “PSI” are to the file titled “Conf.Exhibits-Hurst.pdf,” which contains the PSI, the
domestic violence evaluation, police reports, medical records, and other exhibits.
2
The volume of transcripts contains two separately paginated transcripts: the transcript from the
change of plea hearing, held July 7, 2020, and the transcript from the sentencing hearing, held
September 8, 2020.
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agreed to recommend an aggregate, unified sentence of ten years with four years fixed. (Id.) The
district court accepted Hurst’s guilty pleas. (7/7/20 Tr., p. 8, L. 19 – p. 22, L. 11.)
At sentencing, the state introduced a recording of a call from jail between Hurst and another
party in which Hurst states that “she does know what’s going to happen, right? When I get out?”;
“you don’t get to do me like this and there not be consequences”; and “I’m going to unleash the
[expletive] dogs when I get out.” (9/8/20 Tr., p. 9, L. 10 – p. 10, L. 18; State’s Ex. 1. 3) Hurst’s
wife provided a statement regarding the effects of his conduct on her, stating that she “lived [her]
life by his rules, his times, and his actions,” that he “destroyed [her] life,” and she “live[s] in fear
that he’s going to show up.” (9/8/20 Tr., p. 12, L. 15 – p. 13, L. 23.) A detention deputy from the
Ada County Sheriff’s office testified that, since being jailed on the instant charges, Hurst has
“received a lot of disciplinary reports, a lot of poor behavior, not following jail rules.” (9/8/20 Tr.,
p. 14, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 25.) He was found drawing and trying to mail detailed maps of the jail to
friends in Florida. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 16, L. 10 – p. 17, L. 14.) He made repeated attempts to contact
his wife despite the no-contact order. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 6-19.) Based on the detention deputy’s
testimony, the state argued that Hurst had breached the plea agreement, and the state was relieved
of its obligation to make the agreed recommendation because Hurst failed to comply with jail rules
and regulations while in custody as required by the agreement. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 12-25; R.,
p. 90.) Defense counsel agreed. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 1-5.)
The state recommended an aggregate sentence of ten years fixed. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 814.) Defense counsel recommended an aggregate sentence of five years with one year fixed, with
retained jurisdiction. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 1-6.) The court imposed and executed an aggregate
sentence of ten years with four years fixed, in accordance with the sentence the parties initially
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State’s Ex. 1 is in the record in an mp3 file titled “01_HURST_321-499-5014_05-14-20_1912.”
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agreed the state would recommend. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 42, L. 15 – p. 44, L. 9; R., pp. 107-11.) Hurst
filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 113-15.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
Likewise, the determination not retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
C.

Hurst Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
“Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a clear abuse of discretion if the trial

court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19–2521.” State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001)
(quotation marks and brackets omitted).
An appellant arguing that a sentence is excessive must establish that it was excessive under
any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007);
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 660, 978 P.2d 214, 220 (1999). In determining whether the
appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to
release the defendant on parole is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that
the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887,
4

895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish
that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence
is reasonable “if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015). The district court has the discretion to weigh
those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368
P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding district court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and
protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the trial judge, [the
appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might
differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 191
P.3d at 226-27). “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will
ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
Hurst concedes that his sentence is within statutory limits. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
Nevertheless, without addressing―or even citing―the district court’s sentencing discussion in his
argument, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to impose a lesser
sentence and retain jurisdiction “in light of the mitigating factors, including his troubled childhood,
substance abuse issues and their longstanding impact on his life, mental health issues, and his
amenability to treatment.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.) Hurst has not shown an abuse of discretion.
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The district court correctly recognized that both the PSI and the domestic violence
evaluation reflected that Hurst is a high risk to reoffend. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 40, Ls. 17-22; PSI, pp. 1112 (domestic violence evaluation reflecting a “high probability for future domestic violence”), 15,
25 (PSI reflecting LSI-R score of 41, in the high-risk category).) Both the domestic violence
evaluator and the presentence investigator stated that Hurst was not a viable candidate for
supervision and treatment in the community. (PSI, pp. 12 (domestic violence evaluator
recommending “criminogenic treatment program through the department of correction” and that
it “is unlikely that he will benefit from a community-based program”), 26 (presentence investigator
stating “Mr. Hurst does not present as a viable candidate for community supervision”).)
The court correctly noted that, even since his arrest, Hurst had “been a constant problem
for jail staff” (9/8/20 Tr., p. 40, L. 22 – p. 41, L. 1), with a variety of disciplinary issues, including
attempts to contact the victim he assaulted and who was the subject of a no-contact order, attempts
to draw maps of the jail and mail them to third-parties, and misuse of the grievance system (9/8/20
Tr., p. 14, L. 19 – p. 18, L. 19; PSI, pp. 60-68, 287-88).
The court was also very, and very reasonably, concerned regarding the recording of Hurst’s
call from jail with a third-party in which Hurst stated, referring to his wife, “she does know what’s
going to happen, right? When I get out?”; “you don’t get to do me like this and there not be
consequences”; and “I’m going to unleash the [expletive] dogs when I get out.” (9/8/20 Tr., p. 41,
Ls. 2-9; State’s Ex. 1.) As the court correctly concluded, it is obvious that those statements
strongly suggest that Hurst “would be inclined to commit violence upon the victim when he is
released from jail.” (9/8/20 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 10-12.) Even after the court announced Hurst’s
sentence, which included a no-contact order protecting his wife and his daughter, Hurst told the
court that he would not abide by that order. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 5-16.) Just as he had with his
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attempts to contact his victim from jail, Hurst made it completely clear that he had no respect for
the court’s authority, and no real recognition of the severity of his offenses and of the harm they
had caused.
Next, the court noted that the criminal conduct here exemplified a disturbing pattern for
Hurst. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 41, L. 23 – p. 42, L. 3.) As part of a fairly substantial criminal history (PSI,
pp. 21-23), Hurst was convicted of stalking―amended from aggravated stalking―where he was
alleged to have harassed and threatened an ex-girlfriend and her family for months, ignoring police
instructions to desist, and resorting to violence, attempting to run them off the road in a vehicle.
(PSI, pp. 22, 71-72). He then had an additional stalking conviction in Idaho. (PSI, p. 23.) In 2017,
two years before the events at issue here, he repeatedly appeared at his wife’s place of work after
having been told not to do so; threatened her supervisor; and repeatedly and persistently called and
sent messages to both her and her supervisor’s phones. (PSI, pp. 73-75.) Hurst systematically and
persistently attempted to control and dominate his wife’s life, placing a “tracking app” on her
phone, harassing her any time location tracking was not turned on, periodically wiping the data
from the phone, using “mental and verbal abuse,” “threaten[ing] her and control[ling] her,” and
“chang[ing] her phone access so that all of the information goes to him and she isn’t able to make
any changes to it.” (PSI, pp. 1-4, 272-78.) He had also been physically violent with her, punching
her in the face several times; “spray[ing] her with pepper spray,” which Hurst thought “was funny”;
and “rupture[ing] her eardrum by hitting her in the side of the head.” (Id.) As the domestic violence
evaluator noted, Hurst has a pattern of manipulative, threatening, and violent behavior towards his
wife, other ex-romantic partners, and even police. (PSI, p. 12.)
The district court had excellent reason to think that Hurst was not suitable for the retained
jurisdiction program, and excellent reason to believe that the sentence imposed was necessary for
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the protection of society generally and Hurst’s wife in particular. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 42, Ls 11-14.)
Nor did the district court ignore or disregard the mitigating factors to which Hurst points on appeal.
Both Hurst’s counsel (9/8/20 Tr., p. 28, L. 7 – p. 29, L. 20) and Hurst (9/8/20 Tr., p. 31, L. 10 – p.
39, L. 12) addressed the court regarding his substance abuse issues, mental health, and difficult
childhood, which were all also addressed in the PSI (PSI, pp. 16-21) and the domestic violence
evaluation (PSI, pp. 3-8, 11-12). 4 The district court stated that it had reviewed the PSI and
considered those issues in discussing its sentencing decision. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 41, L. 13 – p. 42, L.
24.) Ultimately, and for the reasons discussed above, the court was concerned regarding the danger
Hurst presented to the community and to his wife, and suggested that it was more appropriate for
Hurst to “get some help” while incarcerated. (9/8/20 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 21-22.) Hurst’s argument on
appeal is simply a request that this Court reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, and
reevaluate the district court’s determination regarding the importance of the goals of sentencing in
this case. Hurst has failed to show that the court did not exercise reason simply because it gave
less weight to the mitigating circumstances than he desired. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769,
773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no abuse of discretion upon a weighing of mitigating and
aggravating factors in sentencing); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005)
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors). Nor can
he show an abuse of discretion simply by stating that the district court should have been more
concerned about an opportunity for him to rehabilitate outside of a prison setting than the court
was about the protection of society and Hurst’s victim. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, at 965 P.2d at 185
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While the PSI reflects that Hurst has mental health issues, including diagnoses for PTSD and a
panic disorder, there was no GAIN evaluation because Hurst refused to participate. (PSI, p. 21.)
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(holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment,
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).
Hurst has not shown that the court abused its sentencing discretion by declining to retain
jurisdiction and executing the sentence it did.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KILEY A. HEFFNER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

AVW/dd

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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